· 2021年對(duì)歐佩克+來(lái)說(shuō)是充滿挑戰(zhàn)的一年,油價(jià)開(kāi)始回升,帶來(lái)了難以抗拒的誘惑
· 歐佩克+采取了克制,盡管全球能源價(jià)格飆升,但仍拒絕放開(kāi)限產(chǎn)
· 由于世界朝著更加綠色的明天前進(jìn),歐佩克+的官員指出,如果管理不善,能源轉(zhuǎn)型可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致石油和天然氣投資不足,這可能意味著更高的油價(jià)
據(jù)美國(guó)彭博新聞社2021年12月31日?qǐng)?bào)道,歐佩克+在過(guò)去兩年中做了一些令人驚訝的事情。 首先,在疫情爆發(fā)之初,沙特阿拉伯和俄羅斯兩國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在如何應(yīng)對(duì)危機(jī)的問(wèn)題上存在意見(jiàn)分歧,隨后,這兩個(gè)國(guó)家達(dá)成和解,并在歐佩克歷史上最大規(guī)模的減產(chǎn)行動(dòng)中團(tuán)結(jié)起來(lái),以應(yīng)對(duì)疫情造成的需求破壞,這也是前所未有的。
總之,2020年是發(fā)生史無(wú)前例事件的一年。
但2021年并沒(méi)有太大不同。 這對(duì)歐佩克+來(lái)說(shuō)2021年是一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)之年,因?yàn)橛蛢r(jià)開(kāi)始回升,呈現(xiàn)出一種難以抗拒的誘惑,特別是對(duì)海灣地區(qū)和非洲大陸那些最依賴石油的經(jīng)濟(jì)體來(lái)說(shuō)。 然而,他們還是堅(jiān)持了增產(chǎn)計(jì)劃,每月增加40萬(wàn)桶/天的原油產(chǎn)量。
這個(gè)增產(chǎn)計(jì)劃如今仍在實(shí)施,至少要延續(xù)到2022年1月,屆時(shí)歐佩克+可能會(huì)重新考慮原油生產(chǎn)計(jì)劃,因?yàn)橐恍┓治鰩熅娣Q,石油供應(yīng)過(guò)剩迫在眉睫。 歐佩克的分析師并不在其中——該卡特爾預(yù)計(jì),奧密克戎冠狀病毒對(duì)需求的影響將是溫和和暫時(shí)的。 但過(guò)去兩年,歐佩克已經(jīng)證明,它可以保持謹(jǐn)慎。
美國(guó)彭博新聞社的朱利安?李日前曾提醒我們,自歐佩克+成立以來(lái),這個(gè)擴(kuò)大了的卡特爾就一直面臨著艱巨的任務(wù)。 從一開(kāi)始,歐佩克成員國(guó)為了應(yīng)對(duì)美國(guó)的頁(yè)巖熱潮而決定減產(chǎn),到2021年,在一波又一波的新冠肺炎疫情中,歐佩克+不得不靈活應(yīng)對(duì)生產(chǎn),這5年對(duì)歐佩克+來(lái)說(shuō)是充滿挑戰(zhàn)的5年。
鑒于各成員國(guó)的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)往往不同,這種合作具有挑戰(zhàn)性是意料之中的事。 然而,這一政策在某種程度上還是奏效了,盡管在前進(jìn)的道路上有一些磕磕絆絆,比如伊拉克無(wú)法堅(jiān)持其生產(chǎn)配額,為此伊拉克不得不受到額外削減配額的“懲罰”。 這很可能使這個(gè)集團(tuán)對(duì)未來(lái)的任何沖擊都更有彈性。
分析師表示,歐佩克+面臨的第一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)將是供應(yīng)過(guò)剩。 然而,這不會(huì)是一個(gè)很大的挑戰(zhàn),因?yàn)檫@種挑戰(zhàn)被視為是暫時(shí)的,它只會(huì)持續(xù)到奧密克戎毒株過(guò)去,并假設(shè)它會(huì)像之前的幾波一樣糟糕,這是不太可能的,因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)非常務(wù)實(shí)的原因:大多數(shù)政府無(wú)法承擔(dān)得起又一次長(zhǎng)期封鎖。
正如石油行業(yè)觀察人士和歐佩克成員國(guó)指出的那樣,一個(gè)更大的挑戰(zhàn)是備用產(chǎn)量供應(yīng)的減少。 根據(jù)美國(guó)能源信息署(EIA)的數(shù)據(jù),歐佩克2022年最后一個(gè)季度的備用產(chǎn)量供應(yīng)可能降至511萬(wàn)桶/天。 這一數(shù)字將大大低于2021年第一季度的900萬(wàn)桶/天。
美國(guó)EIA對(duì)備用石油產(chǎn)能的定義是:可以在30天內(nèi)開(kāi)始生產(chǎn),并且產(chǎn)能持續(xù)至少90天。 國(guó)際能源署(IEA)對(duì)備用石油產(chǎn)能定義為可以在90天內(nèi)啟動(dòng)生產(chǎn)。
無(wú)論定義如何,全球的備用石油生產(chǎn)能力正在下降,因?yàn)樗皇且粋€(gè)靜態(tài)的石油池。未開(kāi)采的油藏往往會(huì)減少資源,這就是為什么當(dāng)疫情扼殺需求時(shí),那么多石油生產(chǎn)商不愿開(kāi)始封井的一個(gè)重要原因。 一旦你封堵了一口井,此井以后復(fù)產(chǎn)可能性不確定。
說(shuō)到封井,這可能是俄羅斯現(xiàn)在接近其石油生產(chǎn)能力極限的部分原因,而且石油產(chǎn)能比疫情前低得多。 此前,俄羅斯的日產(chǎn)量在1100萬(wàn)桶以上。
現(xiàn)在,路透社援引俄羅斯石油公司的一篇報(bào)道稱,俄羅斯石油日總產(chǎn)量已接近1090萬(wàn)桶的產(chǎn)能,盡管俄羅斯副總理諾瓦克曾表示,俄羅斯的石油日產(chǎn)量將在5月份反彈至1133萬(wàn)桶。
因此,全球大部分的備用石油產(chǎn)能將在歐佩克,更準(zhǔn)確地說(shuō)在中東地區(qū),但即使是這些備用石油產(chǎn)能也需要維護(hù),而維護(hù)就意味著投資。 如今,石油生產(chǎn)方面的投資越來(lái)越難獲得。
沙特阿拉伯能源大臣阿卜杜勒-阿齊茲·本·薩勒曼12月早些時(shí)候曾表示:“如果在能源方面沒(méi)有足夠的支出,我們可能會(huì)進(jìn)入一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)的階段。” 印度財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)穆罕默德·賈達(dá)安也表達(dá)了同樣的看法,他說(shuō):“我們非常擔(dān)心,如果我們不能謹(jǐn)慎掌控轉(zhuǎn)型期,世界可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)能源短缺。”
對(duì)石油生產(chǎn)投資不足發(fā)出警告的不僅僅是沙特阿拉伯。 IHS Markit的丹尼爾·耶金說(shuō),由于石油和天然氣投資不足,世界正把自己拖進(jìn)一系列能源危機(jī)的角落。 眾所周知,美國(guó)石油公司優(yōu)先考慮的是向投資者返還現(xiàn)金,而不是產(chǎn)量增長(zhǎng),而大型石油公司卻在向低碳能源領(lǐng)域投入數(shù)十億美元,以洗刷自己的聲譽(yù)。
所有這一切意味著,在能源安全方面,世界可能會(huì)面臨更艱難的幾年,特別是在部分地區(qū)。 另一方面,由于純粹的基本原因,石油供應(yīng)仍然緊張,歐佩克+可能會(huì)獲得更多的暴利。 當(dāng)然,如果疫情繼續(xù)給我們帶來(lái)震驚,總有可能出現(xiàn)另一個(gè)需求破壞事件,但歐佩克+已經(jīng)在那里,并已經(jīng)這樣做了。歐佩克+會(huì)生存下來(lái),甚至可能變得更強(qiáng)。
李峻 編譯自 美國(guó)油價(jià)網(wǎng)
原文如下:
2022 Could Be A Great Year For OPEC+ Producers
· 2021 was a challenging year for OPEC+ as prices began to recover, presenting a temptation that has always been difficult to resist.
· OPEC+ exercised restraint, however, refusing to open the taps even as energy prices skyrocketed across the globe.
· As the world races towards a greener tomorrow, OPEC+ officials have noted that the energy transition, if not managed well, could lead to underinvestment in oil and gas, which could mean even higher prices. 、
· OPEC+ did some surprising things in the past two years. First, it broke up at the start of the pandemic with its two leaders—Saudi Arabia and Russia—turning on each other because of differences of opinion on how the crisis needed to be handled. Then the two made up, and the group united around the deepest production cuts in the history of OPEC in response to the demand destruction caused by the pandemic, also unprecedented.
· All in all, 2020 was a year of unprecedented events.
· But this year was not that much different. It was a challenging one for OPEC+ as prices began to recover, presenting a temptation that has always been difficult to resist, especially for the most oil-dependent economies in the Gulf and Africa. And yet resist they did, sticking to a production increase plan seen adding 400,000 bpd in combined oil production every month.
This plan is still in action, at least until January, when OPEC+ may reconsider as some analysts warn of looming oil oversupply. OPEC's analysts are not among these—the cartel expects a mild and temporary effect on demand from the omicron variant of the coronavirus. But the cartel has proved in the past two years that it could be cautious.
Bloomberg's Julian Lee earlier this week reminded us that ever since its inception, the extended OPEC+ cartel has had its work cut out for it. From the very beginning, when members decided to reduce production in response to the U.S. shale boom, to this year, when they had to be flexible with production amid wave after wave of Covid-19 infections, it's been a challenging five years for OPEC+.
The challenging nature of the cooperation was only to be expected given the often different priorities of member states. And yet it somehow worked, even with bumps along the road such as Iraq's inability to stick to its production quotas, for which it had to be "punished" by getting additional cut quotas. And this may well have made the group more resilient to any future shocks.
According to analysts, the first challenge would be excess supply. It would not be much of a challenge, however, as it is seen as temporary, only until the omicron wave passes, and assuming it would be as bad as previous waves, which is a bit unlikely for a very pragmatic reason: most governments cannot afford another long lockdown.
A much bigger challenge, as noted by oil industry observers and OPEC members, is dwindling spare production supply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, OPEC's spare capacity could fall to 5.11 million bpd in the final quarter of next year. This is down from 9 million bpd in the first quarter of 2021.
The Energy Information Administration defines spare oil production capacity as oil production that can be started within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days. The International Energy Agency defines spare capacity as production that can be cranked up in 90 days.
Whatever the definition, the world's spare oil production capacity is falling because it is not a static pool of oil. Oil reservoirs that are not exploited tend to diminish in resources—one big reason why so many oil producers were reluctant to start plugging wells when the pandemic killed demand. once you plug a well, it may or may not return to full or any production.
Speaking of plugging wells, these may well be part of the reason Russia is now near its capacity of producing oil, and it's a much lower level than before the pandemic. Before, Russia was pumping north of 11 million bpd.
Now, according to a Reuters report citing Russian oil companies, total output is nearing capacity at 10.9 million bpd, even though Deputy PM Alexander Novak has argued Russia's oil production will rebound to 11.33 million bpd by May.
Most of the spare capacity, therefore, will be in OPEC, and more precisely, in the Middle East. But even that spare capacity needs maintenance, and maintenance means investment. And investments in oil production are getting harder to come by these days.
"We're heading toward a phase that could be dangerous if there's not enough spending on energy," Saudi Arabia's Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said earlier this month. The sentiment was echoed by Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan: "We have very serious concerns that the world could run short of energy if we are not careful in managing the transition."
It's not just the Saudis that are warning about underinvestment, either. IHS Markit's Daniel Yergin said the world is painting itself into a corner featuring a series of energy crunches because of insufficient investment in oil and gas. And it's public knowledge that U.S. oil companies are prioritizing returning cash to investors rather than production growth while Big Oil is pouring billions in low-carbon energy to clean up its reputation.
What all this means is that the world may be in for a few more tough years in terms of energy security, especially parts of it. OPEC+, on the other hand, may be in for some more windfall profits as the supply of oil remains tight for purely fundamental reasons. Of course, there is always the possibility of another demand destruction event in case the pandemic continues to surprise us, but OPEC+ has already been there and has done that. It will survive and maybe even become stronger.
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