據(jù)伍德麥肯茲1月20日報道，能源危機、金屬超級周期、轉(zhuǎn)型成本挑戰(zhàn)、更高的投資和100美元/桶價格的預(yù)期，在經(jīng)歷了一年的戲劇性復(fù)蘇之后，2022年能源和自然資源方面發(fā)展將如何？這里有五個主題，以及相關(guān)的風(fēng)險。

一是能源危機有解決辦法嗎？

今年（北半球）冬天，歐洲和亞洲的天然氣和電力價格可謂“眾望所歸”。

對于天然氣來說，完美的風(fēng)暴導(dǎo)致了自去年第三季度以來的創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄運行。歐洲電力市場也受到了類似事件的沖擊，高漲的天然氣價格加劇了因產(chǎn)能閑置、發(fā)電廠可用性受限、低水電以及向可再生能源轉(zhuǎn)變，導(dǎo)致了緊張情緒。一個糟糕的冬天將推動天然氣和電力價格在已經(jīng)接近歷史水平的情況下，進(jìn)一步走高。

價格將在春季回落，但天然氣市場在結(jié)構(gòu)上比疫情爆發(fā)之前更緊張。受批準(zhǔn)的項目減少，意味著從2022年到2025年，每年新增的液化天然氣供應(yīng)量平均僅為120萬噸，不到過去四年的一半。預(yù)計歐洲和亞洲液化天然氣價格將穩(wěn)定在2015年至2020年期間的平均價格兩倍以上，直到2026年新的供應(yīng)量投入使用。

歐洲的電力價格也將繼續(xù)高于危機爆發(fā)前，問題的根源在于，隨著時斷時續(xù)的可再生能源獲得市場份額，而靈活的天然氣和燃煤電廠卻被擠出市場，靈活性受到了擠壓。世界各地的其他市場也面臨著同樣的挑戰(zhàn)，而答案就在于一系列靈活的技術(shù)，包括電池存儲。

風(fēng)險是什么？需求的破壞以及天然氣和電力的高價格阻礙了經(jīng)濟的復(fù)蘇，可承受性成為一個主要的政治問題。人們對“將天然氣和電力作為可靠、穩(wěn)定和可負(fù)擔(dān)的能源來源”作為能源轉(zhuǎn)型核心的看法受到了質(zhì)疑。在天然氣價格持續(xù)高漲的地區(qū)，原料成本向綠氫傾斜，而不是向藍(lán)氫傾斜。

二是金屬超級周期遭遇逆風(fēng)？

盡管面臨著新冠肺炎疫情引發(fā)政府緊急刺激措施退出的不利影響，但從危機中恢復(fù)的強勁經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇將在2022年繼續(xù)。預(yù)計全球GDP增速將略低于4%，低于2021年5.5%的亮麗成績。

復(fù)蘇的經(jīng)濟，特別是對商品的超常需求已經(jīng)擠壓了供應(yīng)鏈，并將能源和金屬方面的幾乎所有商品價格提升到接近創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄水平。關(guān)鍵過渡金屬，包括銅、鋁、鎳、鋰和鈷市場也在著眼于更長遠(yuǎn)的發(fā)展，預(yù)計隨著低碳基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施在全球推廣，對去碳化的投資將會持續(xù)。

轉(zhuǎn)型需求將導(dǎo)致金屬市場出現(xiàn)結(jié)構(gòu)性緊縮，并引發(fā)對礦山供應(yīng)的大規(guī)模投資，但這種轉(zhuǎn)型需求還需要幾年時間。在短期內(nèi)，市場有趨向于過剩，因此在2022年有反彈勢頭消失的危險。

有什么風(fēng)險？奧密克戎的影響發(fā)出警示，疫情可以帶來經(jīng)濟反復(fù)挫折。美聯(lián)儲縮減量化寬松政策，提高利率以對抗通貨膨脹(從零到年底高達(dá)2%)。關(guān)鍵金屬價格的持續(xù)高企，減緩了低碳經(jīng)濟的推廣。

三是資本紀(jì)律會讓位于機構(gòu)性投資嗎？

在今天的價格環(huán)境下，石油和天然氣、金屬、鐵礦石和煤炭生產(chǎn)者正在產(chǎn)生創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的自由現(xiàn)金流。然而，投資者繼續(xù)要求將現(xiàn)金用于償還債務(wù)或返還給股東。在勘探開發(fā)和采礦業(yè)，資本支出接近多年來低點。

2022年，投資將從危機低點回升，盡管人們并不期望迅速轉(zhuǎn)向增長。低碳化經(jīng)營正迅速成為所有行業(yè)的優(yōu)先事項。力拓集團就是一個例子，在2022年，該公司將首次撥款5億美元（占支出的6%）用于降低運營成本，并計劃在2030年前，每年將這一數(shù)字翻倍。

對可再生能源機構(gòu)性投資已經(jīng)有了強勁上升趨勢，預(yù)計2022年全球太陽能發(fā)電量將增加17%，風(fēng)能將增加11%。上游石油和天然氣支出將增長約9%，突破4000億美元，增長最初由國家石油公司主導(dǎo)；今年晚些時候，國際石油公司將增加對短周期項目投資，特別是美國二疊紀(jì)盆地項目。當(dāng)然，大石油公司將繼續(xù)把越來越多的可支配支出用于低碳機會。

2022年，金屬和采礦業(yè)前景最不樂觀。該行業(yè)的項目是稀缺的，并購是加強投資機會的必要第一步。但要實現(xiàn)交易，在價格反彈后，買賣價差可能過大。

風(fēng)險是什么？更高的成本扼殺了可再生能源的投資和增長速度。大型企業(yè)、獨立企業(yè)和私營企業(yè)對上游投資持續(xù)不足，將市場份額讓給了國家石油公司，增加了十年后石油和天然氣價格波動的可能性。中國鞏固了其在關(guān)鍵過渡金屬供應(yīng)鏈上的主導(dǎo)地位。

四是成本上升能否阻擋能源破壞者的步伐？

COP26的成功，特別是第6條和各種凈零承諾，為必要的政策支持和投資激勵鋪平了道路。在美國，這包括美國對碳捕集與封存的45Q稅收減免（間接地幫助了藍(lán)氫發(fā)展）和有利于綠氫項目排放相關(guān)支持。飆升的歐盟排放交易計劃價格，現(xiàn)在超過100美元/噸，這也是另一個促進(jìn)因素。

在監(jiān)測了200種處于不同發(fā)展階段的新興技術(shù)后，最成熟的技術(shù)，包括太陽能、陸上和海上風(fēng)能，已經(jīng)能夠吸引大筆資金來擴大規(guī)模。電動汽車（全球銷量在2021年翻了一番之后，預(yù)計將增長31%，達(dá)到850萬輛）、儲能（包括電動汽車電池）和電網(wǎng)終端（包括最重要的電動汽車充電基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施）仍有商業(yè)化的挑戰(zhàn)，但正逐漸接近主流。

其他一些不太成熟的技術(shù)，對實現(xiàn)凈零排放目標(biāo)也很關(guān)鍵。在那些將成為2022年資本市場焦點的項目中，包括氫氣（項目管道在2021年翻了一番）和CCS。

風(fēng)險是什么？投入成本和工資的上漲、供應(yīng)鏈的挑戰(zhàn)和物流阻礙了一系列低碳技術(shù)的推廣和發(fā)展。電解器制造能力已經(jīng)在快速提升，但卻難以跟上氫氣的指數(shù)式增長。

五是油價會上升到100美元/桶以上嗎？

至少在2022年的任何持續(xù)時期都不太可能出現(xiàn)。在歐佩克+的精心管理下，預(yù)期市場在2022年將再次恢復(fù)平衡。到第三季度，需求增加450萬桶/天，回到疫情爆發(fā)前1億桶/天的水平，而供應(yīng)增加480萬桶/天，大約一半來自歐佩克+。隱含庫存顯示2022年第一季度出現(xiàn)過剩，預(yù)計不會出現(xiàn)供應(yīng)短缺。預(yù)測布倫特平均為70美元/桶，略低于2021年。

風(fēng)險是什么？由于新冠肺炎疫情及其變異病毒，我們已經(jīng)將2022年的需求削減了近10萬桶/天。歐佩克預(yù)計地緣政治因素不會在2022年解除，但多達(dá)100萬桶/天的原油可能在幾個月內(nèi)重返市場。但地緣政治因素可能會給市場帶來沖擊。

王佳晶 摘譯自 伍德麥肯茲

原文如下：

Big themes in 2022 for energy and natural resources

The energy crisis, the metals supercycle, transition cost challenges, higher investment and the chances of US$100/bbl oil

After a year of dramatic recovery, what will shape the world of energy and natural resources in 2022? Here are five themes, and associated risks.

1. Is there a fix for the energy crisis?

Gas and power prices in Europe and Asia are in the lap of the gods this (northern hemisphere) winter.

For gas, the perfect storm has led to a record run since Q3. Power markets in Europe have been hit by a similar chain of events – high gas prices added to system tightness caused by capacity retirements, constrained plant availability, low hydro and the shifting mix towards renewables. A bad winter will push gas and power prices – already near record levels – higher still.

Prices will fall back in the spring, but the gas market is structurally tighter than before the pandemic. Fewer sanctioned projects mean new LNG supply will average just 12 MT a year from 2022 to 2025, less than half that of the last four years. We expect LNG prices in Europe and Asia to settle at more than double the average for prevailing prices between 2015 and 2020 until new supply comes onstream in 2026.

European power prices, too, will remain higher than pre-crisis. The root problem is a flexibility crunch as intermittent renewables gain market share while flexible gas and coal plant are squeezed out of the mix. Other markets around the world face the same challenge, and the answer lies in a range of flexible technologies including battery storage.

The risks? Demand destruction and high prices for gas and power hinders the economic recovery and affordability becomes a major political issue. The perception of gas and power as reliable, stable and affordable sources of energy central to the energy transition comes into question. Feedstock costs tilt the field in favour of green hydrogen over blue in regions with persistent high gas prices.

2. Headwinds for the metals supercycle?

The strong economic recovery from the crisis continues in 2022 – despite a headwind from the withdrawal of pandemic-induced, emergency government stimulus. We expect global GDP growth of just under 4%, below 2021’s stellar 5.5%.

The resurgent economy – specifically, the extraordinary demand for goods – has squeezed supply chains and lifted almost all commodity prices in energy and metals to near-record levels. Markets in key transition metals – including copper, aluminium, nickel, lithium and cobalt – are also looking to the longer term, anticipating sustained investment in decarbonisation with a global roll-out of low-carbon infrastructure.

We believe a metals supercycle is coming, just not yet. The transformative transition demand that will lead to structural tightening in metals markets and trigger massive investment in mine supply is some years away. In the short term, we see markets trending to surplus so there’s a danger the steam comes out of the rally in 2022.

The risks? The impact of Omicron is a reminder that Covid-19 can deliver recurring economic setbacks. The Federal Reserve tapers QE with interest rates raised to counter inflation (from zero to as high as 2% by year end). Persistent high prices for key metals slows the roll-out of the low-carbon economy.

3. Will capital discipline give way to organic investment?

Producers across oil and gas, metals, iron ore and coal are generating record free cash flow at today’s prices. Yet investors continue to dictate that cash is used to pay down debt or returned to shareholders. In E&P and mining, capital expenditure is near multi-year lows.

Investment will pick up in 2022 from the lows of the crisis, though we don’t expect a swift pivot to growth. Decarbonising operations is rapidly becoming a priority across all sectors. One example is Rio Tinto, which has indicated a first-time allocation of US$0.5 billion (6% of spend) in 2022 to decarbonise operations and aims to spend double that each year to 2030.

Organic investment in renewables is already on a strong upward trend and we expect solar capacity to increase by 17% globally and wind by 11% in 2022. Upstream oil and gas spend will be up around 9% to break US$400 billion, with the increase led initially by NOCs; later in the year, IOCs will increase investment in short-cycle projects, notably the US Permian. Big Oil, of course, continues to direct an increasing share of its discretionary spend into low-carbon opportunities.

metals and mining look least promising in 2022. The industry’s project hopper is thin, and we think M&A is a necessary first step to strengthen the opportunity set. But for deals to happen, the buyer/seller spread may be too wide after the rally in prices.

The risks? Higher costs stifle the pace of renewables investment and growth. Continued underinvestment in upstream by Majors, Independents and private companies cedes market share to NOCs and increases the chances of oil and gas price volatility later in the decade. China cements its dominance of the supply chains for key transition metals.

4. Could rising costs stall the energy disruptors?

The success of COP26, notably Article 6 and various net zero pledges, paves the way for the necessary policy support and incentives for investment. In the US, these include the US 45Q tax credit for carbon capture and storage (indirectly helpful for blue hydrogen) and emissions-related support that favours green hydrogen. A soaring EU ETS price, now above $100/tCO2, is another fillip.

We monitor 200 emerging technologies at different stages of development. The most mature, including solar, onshore and offshore wind, are already able to attract big capital to scale up. EVs (global sales are expected to be up 31% to 8.5 million after more than doubling in 2021), energy storage (including EV batteries) and grid edge (including the all-important EV charging infrastructure) still have commerciality challenges but are getting closer to mainstream.

Others, less mature, are also critical to meeting net zero goals. Among those that will be the focus of capital markets in 2022, hydrogen (the project pipeline doubled in 2021) and CCS (today’s nascent project pipeline will need to increase 14-fold for a 1.5 °C pathway).

The risks? Rising input costs and wages, supply chain challenges and logistics hamper the roll-out and development of a raft of low-carbon technologies. Electrolyser manufacturing capacity, already ramping up fast, struggles to keep up with hydrogen’s exponential growth.

5. Will oil prices rise above US$100/bbl?

Unlikely, at least for any sustained period in 2022. Under the careful stewardship of OPEC+, the market is back in balance again in 2022 on our forecasts. Demand increases by 4.5 million b/d back to pre-pandemic levels of 100 million b/d by Q3, whereas supply rises by 4.8 million b/d, around half from OPEC+. Implied inventories show a surplus in Q1 2022 – we do not expect a shortage of supply. Our forecast is for Brent to average US$70/bbl, marginally below 2021.

The risks? Coronavirus – we’ve already trimmed 2022 demand by almost 0.1 million b/d due to Covid and its variants. OPEC politics – we don’t expect Iran sanctions to be lifted in 2022 but up to 1 million b/d of crude could return to market within months. Geopolitics – Russia/Ukraine, China/Taiwan and Belarus/Poland/EU are potential flashpoints that could spook markets.

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